Who is Howard Chu?

Howard Chu is the Chief Architect of the OpenLDAP project and its main corporate sponsor Symas Corporation. OpenLDAP is a free, open source implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) which provides an enterprise with shared address books, single sign-on functionality, automount of home directories and file sharing for Linux, Unix, Mac and Windows clients.

Q: Can you tell us a little bit about what you do, the OpenLDAP project, its relationship with Symas?

Well, as Chief Architect for the OpenLDAP Project I occasionally make decisions about what technical features should or should not be integrated into the code. For the most part though, developers in the OpenLDAP community simply work on whatever they choose, whatever scratches their itch. I wrote my first contribution in 1998 and was invited to join the core team shortly after that. Under Kurt Zeilenga's leadership, most of the early development in OpenLDAP was focused on cleaning up portability issues and implementing LDAPv3. The more radical evolution of the code since its UMich origins has been at my instigation and most of that is my code. I've been working full time on the project since 1999 as a Founder of Symas which has chosen to invest in this technology through funding my participation.

Q: How do you compare OpenLDAP with proprietary directory services technologies like Active Directory or SunOne?

Active Directory is fundamentally flawed in so many areas it barely deserves mention. It is grossly non-compliant with the LDAP specifications, breaking interoperability. And its database design is so broken it can barely get out of its own way. Our recent assessment of AD and Active Directory Application Mode (ADAM) as LDAP servers and the benchmarks that show it to be 3 to 5 times slower convinced us that enterprise strategies based on that as a production enterprise directory are headed for trouble. See Symas' enterprise assessment whitepaper of Microsoft Active Directory's Application Mode versus OpenLDAP and the report's update.

SunOne was, for some years, probably the leading directory technology in the industry. However, the original development teams walked away from the code base years ago and it's showing its age, with numerous well documented stability and maintainability issues. Today OpenLDAP has a significant lead in performance, scalability, and reliability. Unfortunately we can't publish benchmark results against SunOne due to a restriction in their end user license. It's worth nothing, however, that SunOne is being replaced by OpenDS, an open source directory project written in Java. The reign of Sun's proprietary directory service is over; SunOne has reached the end of the line.

OpenLDAP is unmatched by any other directory service, proprietary or open source. Of all the others available, the proprietary ones are just hiding their dirty laundry and all of them are just a waste of time and money.

Q: We are seeing the emergence of an Open Source software stack upon which it is perfectly possible to run an enterprise. Where do you see OpenLDAP's position in this 'Open Source enterprise stack'?

I think the best answer to that is to point to HP's Open Source Investment Portfolio and Open Source Middleware Stack. The selected OpenLDAP as the directory technology (and Symas as the support partner).

Several smaller ISVs have also adopted OpenLDAP as their directory technology of choice (Ventyx and Zimbra the most notable) and we expect more announcements of that type.

Q: It seems every OSS project has its own different LDAP schema, for example Samba's schema is very different from those used by GOsa or Kolab. What's your solution to the problem of schema proliferation and associated problems of incompatibility and complexity?

Schema proliferation in LDAP directories is really quite manageable. The main point is to get these various teams to publish formal specifications of their schema for public review, to aid in their adoption. As an example, we're working with the Samba team and IETF Kerberos working group to develop a standard LDAP schema for Kerberos KDC information. We're creating a rational superset of the schemas currently used by Heimdal and MIT, which can be consistently implemented by both and then relied upon by Samba and other applications that need to work closely with Kerberos and LDAP. It's simple really: the people and teams have to interoperate, in order to ensure that the software will interoperate.

It's a bit surprising that this is even considered a problem in the LDAP space, because it's generally so easy to address. You very rarely run into truly incompatible schema definitions. Usually you just find that the published standard schema are incomplete or inadequate for a specific application you had in mind. That's to be expected, since most of the published schema are only intended as starting points, and they're meant to be extended and mixed and matched with other schema. In contrast, schema management in relational databases is a truly intractable problem. There are no shared definitions in the SQL world like there are in X.500/LDAP. In fact there isn't even a single SQL in the first place, there are a variety of subtly incompatible dialects without any authoritative reference. Even such fundamental concepts as elementary data types (integer, Int64, etc.) lack a standard definition across various implementations.

Of course we do run into situations where in depth education is needed. We do a lot of formal and informal consulting for enterprises moving to OpenLDAP. Some compatibility concerns occasionally pop up but they're quickly addressed as technical staff gets up to speed with early "LDAP University" classes that Symas teaches.

Q: How can the OSS community work better towards encouraging the use of OpenLDAP by enterprises?

It's first about selecting LDAP as the technology for directory data. We see enterprises and OSS projects implementing directory data stores with other technologies and they rarely scale, perform, or administer adequately for enterprise deployments. LDAP offers a superior and readily available database for directory data. Second, take the time to qualify your LDAP use against OpenLDAP. Having invested in LDAP capable code, you should test it against the most standards-compliant LDAP technology and offer your users the chance to easily deploy on OpenLDAP. Third, they should benchmark the OSS directory technologies using the proposed schema, representative data samples and workloads, and at numbers of entries similar to what enterprises might need. These benchmarks are simple to do and Symas can help a project get started with the OSS benchmarking technology we use constantly. Those three steps will quickly convince OSS developers to endorse OpenLDAP as their recommended OSS directory technology.

The 20th February 2008 was one of those 'Microsoft moments', when suddenly, the world changed. Just like when they 'got' the network (and we got NT), or they 'got' the Internet (and we got 'Internet Explorer'). This time they 'got' Open Source and Open Standards and the company is about to make another of their legendary radical transformations... or so they would like you to believe.

The pattern of these 'Microsoft moments' is revealing. Each previous one has come long after most of the rest of the technology world has seen the latest change as inevitable - a situation that with Open Source and Open Standards has been staring us in the face for a long time now.

So does Microsoft's conversion signal the final phase of the ascendancy of Open Source, Open Standards?

Let's look a little closer.

The Microsoft model, as they are explaining it, is becoming asymptotic to the Open Source one. Interoperability, access to the code, free tools for developers and students, open international standards validated by standards bodies. It certainly looks like it, but an asymptotic curve never quite reaches the line.

The good news is that it is an implicit acknowledgement that the way technology is done has irrevocably changed. Their track record shows unequivocally that they will sooner or later adapt to the inevitable. But the real Open Source business model is so alien, so diametrically opposed to the fundamental business model Microsoft has pursued for decades, we must ask if there are alternative explanations, and what the real game-plan is?

Let's put to one side the obvious observation that Microsoft's legal woes in the EU and around the world provide a powerful incentive to make it appear they have changed their ways. And let's do the same with the observation that the critical ISO vote on the fate of their rival office document standard, the cornerstone of the desktop monopoly, is imminent - too obvious, too superficial. Microsoft is far too subtle a tactician to leave it at that.

Open Source and Open Standards have created a potent, compelling, ever-expanding commons of powerful software. A complete, freely- available 'stack' that can be implemented at low cost by companies from one-man bands to Global giants. A commons owned by none and owned by all. It is the secret ingredient of a whole new generation of businesses, and canny adopters from the previous generation. Google is not the only 'poster child' to have realised the supply- side benefits of running their operation on Free Software. And the economic and financial benefits, some would the least of the many benefits, accrue mainly to the users of Open Source software.

Historically, the economic benefits of a commons has primarily benefited the users. Of course the physical commons has always been subject to the so-called 'tragedy of the commons'*. The laws of physics, fortunately, do not apply to the world of ideas (and by extension, software). If I share a good idea, we both benefit, and the idea itself remains undiminished and inexhaustible.

Also historically, the exploitation of the commons to make a few fantastically rich and the rest of us merely 'consumers and customers' has been accomplished by enclosure.

The last significant 'enclosure of the commons' began in England, and enabled the Industrial Revolution. Whilst critics have called it 'the revolution of the rich against the poor', many would concede it also provided many benefits, and many that 'trickled down' to all. This may well be correct, but it is beside the point. Physical commons are finite and exhaustible. Ideas and software are not. The marginal cost of duplicating software is, well, negligible, a phenomenon visibly vexing the considerable talents of the record labels and lawyers of the music industry.

Without enclosure, the inevitable consequence of Open Source and Open Standards will be to drive the cost of software right down close to the marginal cost of replicating it. In economic terms, this is a good thing. A functioning free market is meant to drive down costs and benefit the consumers of a good or service. Open Source, Open Standards is quintessentially free market by nature, and extremely good for competition. Incidentally, it also turns IT into a services business.

So how would one 'enclose the software commons'?

1. Software Patents.
2. Own the standards.
3. Define the terms of the 'game'.

Open Source draws a distinction between 'proprietary' and 'non- proprietary'.

Microsoft attempts to draw a distinction between 'commercial' and 'non-commercial' and seeks to confuse the proprietary/non-proprietary distinction by ignoring it. Ingenuous as well as faintly patronising.

Run the latest announcements through the Open Source filters and the game becomes transparent.

Microsoft has accepted that the rise of 'Open Source' and 'Open Standards' is inevitable. If the authentic version is accepted, monopoly rents will no longer accrue to a single provider, and financial benefits will accrue, heaven forbid!, to the customer. This is simply unacceptable to their long-established business model. The only solution will be to define the game in terms that allows the monopoly to survive. The monopoly is not in the software, it is in the rent from the usage of the software. By enclosing the commons (think of the patent deals with Novell, Xandros and others), by owning the standards, and by defining which 'Open Source' products you are allowed to buy and which you aren't, Microsoft can suddenly make the transition to the new world. Patent Encumbrance. Faux 'standards'. Control the terminology and hence the 'game'.

The enclosure of the commons will proceed by creating a group 'inside the ring-fence' and leaving the rest 'outside'. Those inside will pay, how shall we say it, 'protection' money. If you buy from those 'outside'... well let's just say nasty things happen to people who don't pay.

So you can have your 'Open Source' software if you really insist... just so long as you pay a royalty to Microsoft for every copy that gets shipped. It's great if all those 'non-commercial' people want to develop software for Microsoft and their ring-fenced group of 'authorised' 'Open Source' partners. They generously promise that they wont even sue their unpaid workforce.

And what do you lose?

Just this. In the commons that exists right now, today, the economic and financial benefits accrue mainly to you. In the enclosed commons, they accrue mainly to the supplier that holds the patents and the standards. Business as usual. Checkmate. On the bright side, Microsoft get to keep their margins, and you didn't want to improve yours anyway, did you?

* Note: The 'Tragedy of the commons', in plain English, is simply this: If you and I are free to graze our cattle on a patch of common land, we will rush to make sure our cattle graze it first. The stampede will cause the land to degenerate into a sea of mud. Apologists for rich landowners used this argument to show how the enclosure of the physical commons was 'good for us'.

Yes, it does seem unlikely doesn't it? Windows has been the only reality for several generations of computer users. But is the tide finally beginning to turn?

At the Education Show held in February 2007, the talk was of 'sustainable' computing and how schools could use technology to reduce their 'carbon footprint'. Nobody had any idea of what was to come – a host of Linux-based, ultra-portable, incredibly cheap and very green personal laptops.

Asus's EeePC was the first to arrive in the UK and has been aggressively marketed by RM plc (traditionally a Microsoft supplier). The EeePC sold out within days of its launch. RM's projected sales for the EeePC are 250,000 units in 2008.

At the Education Show this year British supplier Elonex will launch their 'Elonex One' sub-notebook. A Linux-based device that will retail for less than £100.

Eighteen months ago it would be unthinkable to make the prediction that by 2013 Linux would supplant Windows as the operating system of choice for most school children. We're now beginning to think the unthinkable.

What the new notebooks have in common

• The sub-notebooks are small. Typically they have a 7" screen and weigh under a kilo.
• They use 2 watts to 6 watts of power, have no hard disk or CDROM.
• They have 2-8 GB of solid-state storage and all run Linux as their principle operating system.
• Costs ranges from sub-£100 to around £200.
• They are very robust products aimed squarely at the 'school bag' but most will also work with the keyboards, mice and monitors already at use in schools.

The leading contenders

The One Laptop per Child Project (laptop.org) has the wireless X0-1, is aimed at emerging markets, currently costs less than $200 and runs a version of Red Hat's Fedora Linux.

Intel's Classmate offers two versions of Linux operating systems both using the Red Hat package manager. They also have a Windows XP version.

Asus' EeePC supplied to schools by RM costs less than £170 to educational buyers and uses a Debian-based Linux operating system.

Britains' Elonex's 'Elonex-One' and Canada's InkMedia products have emerged very recently, having detachable keyboards, costing less than £100 and again using a Debian-derived Linux operating systems.

These products are popular because of their size, their cost and the range of software that they come with. The fact that they run Linux and come with free, open source applications is largely unnoticed by the users.

Why Linux and not Windows?

Windows XP Home can run on devices like the EeePc and the Classmate but it is not officially supported by Microsoft and thus obsolete.

Worse still, RM plc is selling their Windows XP Home version of the EeePC to schools for 50% more than the Linux version. A £269 notebook will do nothing for school children. Proprietary lock-in tactics so successful in monopolising the desktop, have less effect on a new generation plugged into Web 2.0 and SaaS technologies.

Windows Vista will never be able to run on this new breed of personal computer. Even Becta, the government's quango overseeing the use of ICT by schools, admits Vista is too hungry for power and resources for use by most schools. Microsoft, it appears, simply does not have an operating system ready to fit the new niche. Windows CE is dead and the Pocket PC won't scale up.

Convergence technologies based on Linux are now everywhere - smart phones, set-top boxes, PDAs, satellite navigators, digital photo frames. Any concerns that such devices would be unacceptable to users because they don't run Windows are unfounded. Quite the opposite.

Some go as far as argue that Microsoft has tacitly admitted defeat in as much as they have signed a patent protection agreement with the Linux distributions used by the Classmate (Novell) and the EeePC (Xandros).

Summary

Children need access to technology that is affordable, robust and able to bridge the digital divide between rich and poor. This new generation of computers offers just that. Open Source software has made it possible to provide every child with access to the Internet, high quality office software and to a wide range of graphics and music software. As schools adapt to a new reality - one laptop per child – the only viable, supportable, affordable option is low cost, highly portable laptops running Linux not Windows.